THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION -- the Fetu

How should we make the case against abortion? Over thirty years after Roe v. Wade, pro-life advocates remain divided on the central issue of argument and strategy. This vital debate was highlighted in the January/February 2005 addition of Touchstone magazine, and it deserves the attention of all those who contend for the sanctity of human life and seek to bring an end to the scourge of abortion: In the magazine's lead article, philosopher Francis J. Beckwith takes on what he describes as the “new rhetorical strategy” now commonly advocated by some pro-life activists.

This new strategy is based on the conviction that the older line of argument which focused on the indisputable humanity of the fetus has failed to sustain a compelling social movement against abortion. Instead of focusing on the fetus, advocates of the new strategy suggest that the pro-life movement should redirect its argument to “the alleged harm abortion does to women.” Beckwith, a professor of church-state studies at Baylor University, argues that the “new rhetorical strategy” is fatally flawed and will actually serve to support the pro-abortion worldview. Beckwith points to the fact that, though a vast majority of Americans believe abortion to be a moral evil, these same people do not believe abortion to be so inherently immoral that it should be made illegal. “Even though the vast majority of Americans see abortion to be morally wrong and believe that it is the taking of a human life,” Beckwith explains, “many in that majority do not consider it a serious moral wrong (i.e. unjustified homicide). ”Beckwith is on to something here. A wealth of statistical data indicates that Americans see abortion as morally wrong. As a matter of fact, a majority of women seeking abortion indicate that they know that what they are doing is morally wrong or, at the very least, is “deviant behavior.” On this basis, advocates of the new strategy suggest that pro-lifers should move on to a new argument. Beckwith sees this as a serious mistake. Where advocates of the new strategy argue that Americans already know that the killing of a fetus is morally wrong, Beckwith counters that Americans obviously do not believe that abortion is sufficiently immoral to be made illegal. “Until the American populous judges abortion to be a serious moral wrong rather than a mere moral wrong,” Beckwith asserts, “their opinion on the legal status of abortion will not likely shift in a pro-life direction.” Advocates of the new rhetorical strategy have argued that since the vast majority of Americans already believe that the fetus is human, and nonetheless support abortion as a legal right, the obvious alternative is to shift the argument to the negative effect of abortion on the women involved. Beckwith resolutely refuses to shift his argument from the moral status of the fetus. Those who argue that abortion should be legal even as they acknowledge that the fetus is human are, as Beckwith suggests, either sociopaths who simply permit and support what they know to be moral evil, or individuals who are morally immature and fail to see the logic of their own presuppositions.

Beckwith's critique is devastating. As he suggests, the argument that abortion is a negative experience for women fails to take in to account the fact that many women consider abortion to be the easiest way out of a very difficult situation. Once the moral status of the fetus is no longer the ground of argument, women are free to calculate the moral status of their abortion choices without reference to the fact that abortion kills an innocent human life. As Beckwith explains, that argument could lend support to infanticide and other moral atrocities.

Pro-life advocates must return to a moral focus on the fetus and must base our argument on the fact that abortion is the taking of innocent human life. The fact that Americans seem to be supporting a form of moral schizophrenia indicates that most Americans do not have a full understanding of why the fetus must be recognized as fully human and thus deserving of moral protection. Those who advocate a new rhetorical strategy are simply mistaken, Beckwith argues, for “pregnant women seeking abortions generally do not see their fetuses on the same moral plane as they see either themselves or their already born children.” The distinction between a baby and a fetus is central to the moral confusion that marks the American mind on the question of abortion. Clearly, a majority of Americans believe that a fetus is human, but they deny that the unborn child should be granted the same right to life as a baby living outside the womb. Beckwith zeros in on the central issue in the pro-life argument, and asserts that “the pro-life argument is not that abortion is wrong because it kills a baby, but rather, that abortion is morally wrong because it kills a human person who is not yet a baby a label we ordinarily assign to newborns, not preborns but still a fully human person.” Since so many Americans have convinced themselves that a fetus is not a baby, “a woman seeking an abortion can, thanks to this argument, have the abortion without believing she is killing a bona-fide member of the human community.” Thus, the woman is fully aware that she is killing something, but she is not convinced that this preborn life is a baby.

As a philosopher, Beckwith takes both words and arguments with deadly seriousness. Thus, he recognizes the inherent contradiction that marks the position held by millions of Americans. They argue that abortion is morally wrong, and recognize that it is the taking of innocent human life. At the same time, they argue that it would be wrong to impose this moral principle upon women and defend a legal right to abortion as the most appropriate public policy. Insightfully, Beckwith raises the issue of slavery, demonstrating conclusively that the application of this same argument to the question of slavery would never have led to abolition. Beckwith argues that Americans would react in anger to a politician who said, “I am personally opposed to owning a slave and torturing my spouse, but it would be wrong for me to try to force my personal beliefs on someone who felt it consistent with his deeply held beliefs to engage in such behaviors.” This politician would be considered “a moral monster,” Beckwith argues yet this very pattern of argument is precisely what millions of Americans propose as their own highly moral position.

The pro-life movement had better get back to contending for the inherent humanity and dignity of the fetus, Beckwith argues, or the argument against abortion will be lost. Americans must be shown that “if fetuses are human persons, one cannot be pro-choice on abortion, just as one cannot be pro-choice on slavery and at the same time maintain that slaves are human persons.” As Beckwith summarizes his argument: “In other words, the pro-life movement must convince the vast majority of the public that abortion is a serious moral wrong and not a mere moral wrong.” America's current policy concerning abortion established in Roe v. Wade and later court decisions is thus not morally neutral in any sense. The government's policy is based in the presupposition that the fetus does not possess the same right to life as a baby living outside the womb. This is not neutrality Beckwith insists, but hostility toward the fetus. In articles responding to Beckwith, other pro-life advocates consider his arguments. Terry Schlossberg, executive director of Presbyterians Pro-Life, supports Beckwith's case and points out that the pro-life argument must now be extended to the issues of cloning and embryo research. Schlossberg argues that the pro-life argument will only be won when the vast majority of Americans experience something like a moral conversion. “Ultimately settling this question,” she argues, “lies in recognizing every human being as neighbor, and that is a moral settlement. ”A defender of the new rhetorical strategy also responded to Beckwith's article. Frederica Mathewes-Green, an influential writer and pro-live advocate, concedes much of Beckwith's case, but argues that millions of Americans have simply lost the capacity for serious moral reasoning. ”They could agree that the unborn is a living human baby,” she explains, ”and yet shrug off the conclusion that it should not be killed.” This inconsistency, troubling as it is, is what prompted advocates of the new rhetorical strategy to attempt a new argument.

David Mills, Touchstone's editor, admits that the new rhetorical strategy does look attractive. Nevertheless, Mills sided with Beckwith. ”It is a matter of our ultimate goal or end. Saving the lives of unborn children is a great thing, and getting pro-choice media to let pro-life voices be heard is a very good thing, but our ultimate end is changing converting the hearts and minds of the people...” Pointing to the negative consequences of abortion in the life of the mother is all well and good, Mills allows, but in the end the only compelling argument that matters is centered in the inherent humanity of the fetus and thus the tremendous moral evil involved in killing unborn human life. “We want a culture in which unborn children survive to birth,” Mills concludes, “but we need one in which they survive not because people think abortion is painful, but because they know it is wrong.” The Touchstone debate makes for compelling reading, and should serve as a catalyst for the refining of pro-life strategy and argument. Beckwith's case against the new rhetorical strategy is absolutely conclusive, and his arguments should serve as a corrective for pro-life advocates who are growing weary of arguing on behalf of the fetus. Those who oppose abortion and especially those on the front line counseling women who may be seeking abortion should use every honest argument in the pro-life arsenal. Women should be confronted with the pain and other negative effects that will follow their choice for abortion. Nevertheless, in the end, the non-negotiable argument that stands at the center of the argument against abortion is the moral status of the fetus and the horrible moral wrong that abortion represents. In the end, the pro-life argument stands or falls, not on the question of lifestyle, but on the question of life itself.

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EDITORIAL COMMENTS

Care must be taken when using scientific terms. The term “fetus” refers only to the unborn child from 9 weeks post-fertilization or cloning until birth. The term “embryo” refers to the unborn child from fertilization or cloning until the end of 8 weeks the time period when most abortions are formed.

To restrict the public debate to the human “fetus” thus ignores the inherent dignity and humanity of younger unborn human children. We see no reason why the debates cannot consider both the unborn child and the woman simultaneously? Why can we not love them both?

4d image before birth and dugital after birth

(International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 1999,19:3/4:22-47)

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WHEN DO HUMAN BEINGS (normally) BEGIN?

Introduction

The question as to when the physical material dimension of a human being begins via sexual reproduction is strictly a scientific question, and fundamentally should be answered by human embryologists--not by philosophers, bioethicists, theologians, politicians, x-ray technicians, movie stars, or obstetricians and gynecologists. The question as to when a human person begins is a philosophical question. Current discussions on abortion, human embryo research (including cloning, stem cell research, and the formation of mixed-species chimeras), and the use of abortifacients involve specific claims as to when the life of every human being begins. If the "science" used to ground these various discussions is incorrect, then any conclusions will be rendered groundless and invalid. The purpose of this article is to focus primarily on a sampling of the "scientific" myths, and on the objective scientific facts that ought to ground these discussions. At least it will clarify what the actual international consensus of human embryologists is with regard to this relatively simple scientific question. In the final section, I will also address some "scientific" myths that have caused much confusion within the philosophical discussions on "personhood.”

When does a human being begin?

Getting a handle on just a few basic human embryological terms accurately can considerably clarify the drastic difference between the "scientific" myths that are currently circulating, and the actual objective scientific facts. This would include such basic terms as: "gametogenesis," "oogenesis," "spermatogenesis," "fertilization," "zygote," "embryo," and "blastocyst." Only brief scientific descriptions will be given here for these terms. Further, more complicated, details can be obtained by investigating any well-established human embryology textbook in the library, such as some of those referenced below. Please note that the scientific facts presented here are not simply a matter of my own opinion. They are direct quotes and references from some of the most highly respected human embryology textbooks, and represent a consensus of human embryologists internationally.

A. Basic human embryological facts

To begin with, scientifically something very radical occurs between the processes of gametogenesis and fertilization--the change from a simple part of one human being (i.e., a sperm) and a simple part of another human being (i.e., an oocyte--usually referred to as an "ovum" or "egg"), which simply possess "human life", to a new, genetically unique, newly existing, individual, whole living human being (a single-cell embryonic human zygote). That is, upon fertilization, parts of human beings have actually been transformed into something very different from what they were before; they have been changed into a single, whole humanbeing. During the process of fertilization, the sperm and the oocyte cease to exist as such, and a new human being is produced.

To understand this, it should be remembered that each kind of living organism has a specific number and quality of chromosomes that are characteristic for each member of a species. (The number can vary only slightly if the organism is to survive.) For example, the characteristic number of chromosomes for a member of the human species is 46 (plus or minus, e.g., in human beings with Down's or Turner's syndromes).


Every somatic (or, body) cell in a human being has this characteristic number of chromosomes. Even the early germ cells contain 46 chromosomes; it is only their mature forms - the sex gametes, or sperms and oocytes - which will later contain only 23 chromosomes each.1 Sperms and oocytes are derived from primitive germ cells in the developing fetus by means of the process known as "gametogenesis." Because each germ cell normally has 46 chromosomes, the process of "fertilization" can not take place until the total number of chromosomes in each germ cell are cut in half. This is necessary so that after their fusion at fertilization the characteristic number of chromosomes in a single individual member of the human species (46) can be maintained--otherwise we would end up with a monster of some sort.

To accurately see why a sperm or an oocyte are considered as only possessing human life, and not as living human beings themselves, one needs to look at the basic scientific facts involved in the processes of gametogenesis and of fertilization. It may help to keep in mind that the products of gametogenesis and fertilization are very different. The products of gametogenesis are mature sex gametes with only 23 instead of 46 chromosomes. The product of fertilization is a living human being with 46 chromosomes. Gametogenesis refers to the maturation of germ cells, resulting in gametes. Fertilization refers to the initiation of a new human being.

1) Gametogenesis

As the human embryologist Larsen states it, gametogenesis is the process that converts primordial germ cells (primitive sex cells) into mature sex gametes--in the male (spermatozoa, or sperms), and in the female (definitive oocytes). The timing of gametogenesis is different in males and in females. The later stages of spermatogenesis in males occur at puberty, and continue throughout adult life. The process involves the production of spermatogonia from the primitive germ cells, which in turn become primary spermatocytes, and finally spermatids--or mature spermatozoa (sperms). These mature sperms will have only half of the number of their original chromosomes--i.e., the number of chromosomes has been cut from 46 to 23, and therefore they are ready to take part in fertilization.

Oogenesis begins in the female during fetal life. The total number of primary oocytes--about 7 million--is produced in the female fetus" ovaries by 5 months of gestation in the mother's uterus. By birth, only about 700,000 - 2 million remain. By puberty, only about 400,000 remain. The process includes several stages of maturation--the production of oogonia from primitive germ cells, which in turn become primary oocytes, which become definitive oocytes only at puberty. This definitive oocyte is what is released each month during the female's menstrual period, but it still has 46 chromosomes. In fact, it does not reduce its number of chromosomes until and unless it is fertilized by the sperm, during which process the definitive oocyte becomes a secondary oocyte with only 23 chromosomes.

This halving of the number of chromosomes in the oocytes takes place by the process known as meiosis. Many people confuse meiosis with a different process known as mitosis, but there is an important difference. Mitosis refers to the normal division of a somatic or of a germ cell in order to increase the number of those cells during growth and development. The resulting cells contain the same number of chromosomes as the previous cells--in human beings, 46. Meiosis refers to the halving of the number of chromosomes that are normally present in a germ cell - the precursor of a sperm or a definitive oocyte - in order for fertilization to take place. The resulting gamete cells have only half of the number of chromosomes as the previous cells--in human beings, 23.

One of the best and most technically accurate explanations for this critical process of gametogenesis is by Ronan O'Rahilly, the human embryologist who helped to develop the classic Carnegie stages of human embryological development. He also sits on the international board of Nomina Embryologica (which determines the correct terminology to be used in human embryology textbooks internationally):

"Gametogenesis is the production of [gametes], i.e., spermatozoa and oocytes. These cells are produced in the gonads, i.e., the testes and ovaries respectively. … During the differentiation of gametes, diploid cells (those with a double set of chromosomes, as found in somatic cells [46 chromosomes]) are termed primary, and haploid cells (those with a single set of chromosomes [23 chromosomes]) are called secondary. The reduction of chromosomal number … from 46 (the diploid number or 2n) to 23 (the haploid number or n) is accomplished by a cellular division termed meiosis. … Spermatogenesis, the production of spermatozoa, continues from immediately after puberty until old age. It takes place in the testis, which is also an endocrine gland, the interstitial cells of which secrete testosterone. Previous to puberty, spermatogonia in the simiferous tubules of the testis remain relatively inactive. After puberty, under stimulation from the interstitial cells, spermatogonia proliferate … and some become primary spermatocytes. When these undergo their first maturation division (meiosis 1), they become secondary spermatocytes. The second maturation division (meiosis 2) results in spermatids, which become converted into spermatozoa."

"Oogenesis is the production and maturation of oocytes, i.e.; the female gametes derived from oogonia. Oogonia (derived from primordial germ cells) multiply by mitosis and become primary oocytes. The number of oogonia increases to nearly seven million by the middle of prenatal life, after which it diminishes to about two million at birth. From these, several thousand oocytes are derived, several hundred of which mature and are liberated (ovulated) during a reproductive period of some thirty years. Prophase of meiosis 1 begins during fetal life but ceases at the diplotene state, which persists during childhood. … After puberty, meiosis 1 is resumed and a secondary oocyte … is formed, together with polar body 1, which can be regarded as an oocyte having a reduced share of cytoplasm. The secondary oocyte is a female gamete in which the first meiotic division is completed and the second has begun. From oogonium to secondary oocyte takes from about 12 to 50 years to be completed. Meiosis 2 is terminated after rupture of the follicle (ovulation) but only if a spermatozoon penetrates. … The term "ovum" implies that polar body 2 has been given off, which event is usually delayed until the oocyte has been penetrated by a spermatozoon (i.e., has been fertilized). Hence a human ovum does not [really] exist. Moreover the term has been used for such disparate structures as an oocyte and a three-week embryo, and therefore should be discarded, as a fortiori should "egg".”

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To be continued in next newsletter...

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